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THE PREMISES OF THE JUDGMENT AS RES JUDICATA
IN CONTINENTAL AND ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW*
Robert W yness Millar t

III
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW

A.

Initial Considerations

I

N the Anglo-American law the question of the preclusive effect of
the premises of the judgment is attended with vastly more difficulty than under any of the Continental systems. The difficulty is due
not only to the number of independent jurisdictions dealing with the
subJect and the resultant occasion for very considerable divergency of
view, but also, and in an important degree, to the •existence of the
common-law principle of estoppel by record as an institution historically distinct from the Roman-derived principle of res judicata, and
the latter-day failure properly to appreciate the relationship between
the two.
As we have sought to demonstrate elsewhere, estoppel by record,
as recognized in the common-law courts, is a legacy from the Germanic
period when the property of res judicata was wholly lacking to the
judicial judgment. It was originally a true estoppel in the same sense
as the later recognized estoppel by deed and estoppel in pais. In other
words, its actuating motive was the inability of the party to recede from
a condition which he had created or cooperated in creating. Under its
operation the factor of preclusion was not the judgment but the allegation or admission of the party in the judgment-proceeding, which he
was not allowed to contradict. Lord Ellenborough put the case well
'when he said in Outram v. Morewood: 144 "It is not the recovery, but
the matter alleged -by the party, and upon which the recovery proceeds,
which creates the estoppel." When the Roman principle came to be
accepted, as it was in the infancy of the English law, the Germanic
principle was not discarded, but was suffered to coexist with the other.
The two instrumentalities, however, assumed different functions. In

* The first installment of this article, dealing with the Continental law, appeared
in the November issue of the Review, 39 M1cH. L. REv. l (1940).
Professor of Law, Northwestern. L.L.B., M.A.(Hon.), Northwestern. Translator and editor of ENGELMANN~M1LLAR, H1sToRY oF CoNTINENTAL C1v1L PROCEDURE
(1927); author of numerous articles in legal periodicals.-Ed.
144
3 East. 346 at 355, 102 Eng. Rep. 630 (1803).
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this way, the Roman principle operated to bar a new action upon the
same demand, and probably, also, it was this principle that precluded
an unsuccessful defendant from controverting by a new action the right
thus adjudicated. But if it was sought to preclude the same plaintiff,
because of what happened in the first suit, from maintaining a new
action against the same defendant on a different claim, or the same
defendant from maintaining a new action against the same plaintiff,
except as just indicated, this could only be done within the compass,
and subject to the technical rules, of estoppel by record. The estoppel
thus extended to every material issue decided by the verdict, for the
issues obviously were the product of party-acts, viz., the allegations.
And provided that the verdict had been found against the admitting
party, the estoppel extended also to every material admission, tacit or
otherwise, occurring in the pleadings, to the extent of foreclosing, in
the later suit, any allegation contrary to that admission. To be
effective, however, it was necessary that the estoppel be authenticated
by the rendition of judgment. Such were the rules obtaining in the
common-law courts. Manifestly, therefore, so far as the premises of
the judgment were concerned, the doctrine of res judicata had no
application: all was governed by the self-contained principle of estoppel
by record.1'11
Outside of the common-law courts, the technical principle of
estoppel by record found no recognition. And as that principle depended
upon the system of pleading it could not in strictness apply even in a
common-law court, where the previous proceedings invoked by a party
had been had in other than a common-law court, or, if had in a common-law court, were of such a nature that no pleadings had been employed in their conduct. For the wide field thus existing, beyond the
province of the common-law principle, the preclusive effect of the
former proceedings, in respect of the premises of the decision as well as
of the decision itself, necessarily depended upon what the courts conceived to be the operation of the principle of res judicata.146
B.

The English Law at the Opening of the z8oo's

If, then, we look at the situation in England in the opening years
of the nineteenth century, we find the common-law principle being
administered in the common-law courts in all cases where its technical
1411

Millar, "The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Jndicata,"
35 ILL. L. REV. 41 (1940).
146
Ibid., 56-57.
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factors are present. And in r 803 it underwent the clarification resulting
from Lord Ellenborough's classic decision in Outram v. Morewood.
The estoppel, he said, in the words previously quoted, was created by
the allegation, not by the judgment.
"The recovery of itself in an action of trespass," he continued,
"is only a bar to the future recovery of damages for the same
injury; but the estoppel precludes parties and privies from contending to the contrary of that point, or matter of fact, which
having been once distinctly put in issue by them, or by those to
whom they are privy in estate or law, has been, on such issue
joined, solemnly found against them." 147
Plainly evidencing the operation of the same principle in relation
to admission is the case of judgment by default. Thus in Rock v. Layton ( r 700) 148 judgment by default against an administrator had been
held to be conclusive of his possession of assets to the -amount of the
judgment, and in Aslin v. Parker (1758) 140 it had been decided that
a default judgment in ejectment precluded the defendant from contesting the plaintiff's possession in a subsequent action for mesne profits.
In the field lying beyond the domain of technical estoppel, important contribution had been made by cases relating to the conclusiveness
of judgments of the ecclesiastical courts, three of which require particular notice. Blackham's Case (1709),100 decided at nisi prius, was an
action of trover in respect of certain goods owned by Jane Blackham
in her lifetime. As against the plaintiff's proof that the goods were
taken from his possession, the defendant relied upon the grant to him
of letters of administration upon the estate of Jane Blackham. Thereupon the plaintiff proved his marriage to the decedent a few days
before her death. The defendant then contended that the sentence of
the ecclesiastical court awarding the letters was conclusive against the
marriage, "for they could not have granted administration to the defendant, but upon supposing there was no such marriage." But Holt,
C. J., held for the plaintiff on the ground that while th~ sentence of
the ecclesiastical court was conclusive as to "the point directly tried,"
it was not as to a collateral matter to be "collected or inferred from
their sentence."
u 7 Outram v. Morewood, 3 East. 346 at 355, 1oz Eng. Rep. 630 (1803).
1 Ld. Raym. 589, I Salk. 31, Comb. 87, 91 Eng. Rep. z73, rz94, 9z Eng.
Rep. 973 (1700).
140
z Burr. 665, 97 Eng. Rep. 501 (1758).
1 Go I Salk. z90, Holt 661, 91 Eng. Rep. z57, 90 Eng. Rep. 1z65 (1709).
148
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Bouchier v. Taylor (1776) 151 was an appeal from chancery, decided
by the House of Lords. Here it appears that there had been a contest
in the ecclesiastical court as to the right to administer the estate of Ann
Millington, between William Bouchier, claiming as first cousin once
removed of the decedent, and Alice Merchant, claiming as first cousin.
Upon the death of the latter during the pendency of the proceedings,
her executors had been substituted as parties. The ecclesiastical court,
by its sentence, as stated in Brown's Cases, declared that the executors
"had failed in the proof of Alice Merchant's having been the cousingerman or next of kin of Ann Millington; and was pleased ..• to
pronounce and decree for the interest of the appellant William
Bouchier, that he was the lawful cousin-german once removed, and as
far as it appeared to the Court, the next of kin of Ann Millington," 152
and accordingly granted administration to Bouchier. Later, one Taylor,
a residuary legatee under the will of the decedent, with his wife ( who
died pendente lite) filed a bill in chancery against Bouchier and others
for a distribution of the estate. In this suit, the defendants pleaded the
ecclesiastical sentence as conclusive that Alice was not next of kin to the
decedent, but a decree was rendered granting an issue to try this question, and it was from this decree that the appeal to the House of Lords
was taken. The decree was reversed. Our only account of the grounds
for reversal comes from Hargrave's Law Tracts, where it is said that
the result was reached
"without the least opposition from the lord chancellor or any other
lord. And Lord Mansfield, who was the only speaker on the subject, in his reasons against the decree, was clear, that the sentence
was conclusive, notwithstanding the difference, in points of objects
between the two suits; and that the court of chancery, in exercising its concurrent jurisdiction as to distribution, was concluded
by sentences of the spiritual court in granting administration, and
not at liberty to re-examine the points decided in the exercise of
that peculiar jU;risdiction." m
Superficially the result here might seem in conflict with Blackham's
Case, but there is this important difference between the two, that,
whereas in the former case the point in question rested in inference
only, there was here an express pronouncement upon it, namely, a
m

(March

7, 1776) 4

Brown

P.

C.

708, 2

Eng.

Rep. 481 (1776); HARGRAVE,
472 (1787).

COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND
uz

Id., 4

Brown

P.

C.

708

at

709.

158 HARGRAVE, CoLLEC';['ION OF TRACTS RELATIVE To THE

,f.73-475 (1787).
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OF ENGLAND
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declaration in the sentence that the executors of Alice Merchant had
failed in proving her next of kin.
Some weeks after the decision in Bouchier v. Taylor came the
celebrated Duchess of Kingston's Case.m The precise question involved,
that of the conclusiveness, in a prosecution for bigamy, of a sentence ,
of the ecclesiastical court against the validity of a marriage-a question
which the House of Lords decided in the negative-does not affect the
present subject of inquiry. But in the opinion of the judges, which was
called for and received by the House, it was laid down, in limitation of
the conclusiveness attaching to a judgment of a court either of concurrent or of exclusive jurisdiction upon the same matter later coming
in question between the same parties in another court, that "neither the
judgment of a concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction is evidence, of any
matter which came collaterally in question, though within their jurisdiction; nor of any matter incidentally cognizable; ·nor of any matter
to be inferred by argument from the judgment." 155 And Blackham's
Case was referred to with approval as to its holding against the conclusiveness of matter to be inferred from the judgment. In spite of
the exaggerated influence which the quoted expressions have had upon
the later law, it is to be remembered that at best they were but dicta.
Moreover, used, as it must be assumed they were, with full knowledge
of the result reached so shortly before in B ouchier v. Taylor, they could
not have been intended to conflict with that result and so to exclude
from res judicata a matter coming in question and decided in the manner there appearing.
Accordingly, from these cases taken together, it must be considered
that, as to the effect of the judgment-premises, the rule governing the
matter of ecclesiastical sentences was that, although mere inference
from the terms of the judgment was forbidden, whatever had necessarily come to direct decision and express pronouncement in arriving at
the conclusion in chief had attained the property of res judicata.
Pertinent also in this same extra-estoppel area are certain cases
which involved the conclusiveness of judgments of the Exchequer
condemning goods for violation of statutory provisions. The holding
here was that the 3udgment of condemnation precluded the cause of
condemnation from again being litigated in a collateral proceeding,
as in a proceeding by scire f acias on a bond conditioned against a vessel
15
' (April 19, 1776) 20 How St. Tr. 355 (1814), 3 SMITH,
9th Am. ed., 1998 (1889).
155 Id., 20 How. St. Tr. at 538.

LEADING CASES,
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being used for smuggling,156 or on informations for statutory violations
in respect of the goods after their condemnation.157 The argument
against such conclusiveness was well expressed by counsel in Attorney
General v. King (1817),158 decided on a ground not inconsistent with
the holding in question, when he said that, "in practice, the record of
condemnation does not state the cause of forfeiture, and the condemnation itself may have been the result of other conduct, than that with
which the defendants are charged by this information." 159 These cases
therefore, must be looked upon as attaching conclusiveness to the
premises of the judgment, as appearing from the information, although
there is no express pronouncement on the point in the judgment itself. 100
Such are the principal markings of the basis upon which was to
rest the later development in England and America. It will be seen
that there are here exhibited three more or less variant rules-variant
not because of anything materially intrinsic to the subject of decision
but solely because of the different categories of cases in which the question of conclusiveness has arisen. These are ( 1) the rule that conclusiveness attaches or not to the premises as dictated by the principle of
estoppel by record; (2) the rule, or at least the arguable doctrine, that,
in view of the exclusion of collateral and incidental matters and matters
to l;>e inferred by argument from the judgment, as declared in the Duchess
of Kingston's Case, no part of the premises can be regarded as res
judicata unless it appear from the judgment itself to have been the
subject of express decision; and (3)-for this is the necessary interpretation of the condemnation cases before mentioned-the rule that every
part of the premises necessary to support the judgment is to be regarded as res judicata. To trace the ensuing English development in
156

The King v. Matthews, 5 Price 202, 146 Eng. Rep. 582 (1797).
Attorney General v. Wakefield, 5 Price 202, 146 Eng. Rep. 582 (1797);
Attorney General v. Reynolds, 5 Price 203, 146 Eng. Rep. 582 (1804). Scott v.
Shearman, 2 Wm. Black. 976 at 979, 96 Eng. Rep. 575 (1775), does not go to this
extent, holding only that the condemnation was conclusive "that the goods were liable
to be seized."
158
5 Price 195, 146 Eng. Rep. 579 {1817).
159
Id., 5 Price at 208.
160 Not without relevance is the similar rule applied in the case of sentences of
foreign prize courts [Hughes v. Cornelius, 2 Show. 232, 89 Eng. Rep. 907 (1682);
Geyer v. Aguilar, 7 T. R. 681 at 696; IOI Eng. Rep. 1196 (1798); Lothian v.
Henderson, 3 B. & P. 499 at 545, 127 Eng. Rep. 271 (H. L. 1803) ], from which the
English courts have never materially departed. In Lothian v. Henderson, Lord Eldon
expressed what Blackburn, J., in Castrique v. Imrie, L. R. 4 H. L. 414 at 434-435
(1870), describes as "a strong opinion that the practice of receiving the sentences of
Prize Courts as conclusive of the collateral matter was originally a mistake, but had
become inveterate, and could not now be disturbed."
157
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any approach to detail, it need hardly be said, is here out of the question. All that is open to us is to note some of the more significant data.

C.

The Subsequent Course of Decision in England

In the field of estoppel by record at common law is to be particularly noted Howlett v. Tarte ( I 86 I), 1 61 This, supplementing the dictum of Baron Parke in Boileauv. Rutlin ( 1848),162 established the rule,
scarcely to be collected from the older authorities,163 that the estoppel
extended only to preclude an allegation inconsistent with the record in
the former suit, and that consequently, while in the later suit the defendant was estopped from controverting a traversable matter admitted by his
failure to deny in the first suit ( which had gone against him), he was
not estopped from assailing it, in that second suit, by a plea in confession and avoidance. 164
Inseparable as would seem the principle of estoppel by record from
the system of common-law pleading, we find solution sought by its
aid under different conditions of procedure. In Humphries v. Humphries (19rn) 165 the Court of Appeal sought to apply the principle,
as recognized in Howlett v. Tarte, in holding that a defendant against
whom judgment had gone in a county court suit for rent, where there
were no pleadings other than the plaint, was estopped in a second suit,
also in the county court, for subsequently accruing rent, to assert the
defense of the statute of frauds, on the ground that the existence of
161

10 C. B. (N. S.) 813, 142 Eng. Rep. 673 (1861).
2 Exch. 665 at 681, 154 Eng. Rep. 657 (1848): "The facts actually decided
by an issue in any suit cannot be again litigated between the same parties, and are
evidence between them, and that conclusive, upon a different principle, and for the
purpose of terminating litigation; and so are the material facts alleged by one party,
which are directly admitted by the opposite party, or indirectly admitted by taking a
traverse on some other facts, but only if the traverse is found against the party making
it."
163 See Millar, "The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata,"
35 ILL. L. REv. 41 at 53, note 55 (1940).
164
In Carter v. James, 13 M. & W. 137, 153 Eng. Rep. 57 (1844), it had been
held that there was no estoppel where the point (usury of an agreement) although
admitted by failure of the plaintiff to deny the fact of usury alleged in the defendant's
plea in a former suit, had not been in issue in that suit: the estoppel, it was said,
related only to the issues and not to "any of the other facts which were taken in that
case to be true merely for the purpose of deciding the question at issue." I 3 M. & W.
at 148. This decision, however, was plainly at variance with the English law before
and since.
166
(1910] 2 K. B. 531, dismissing appeal from judgment of Divisional Court,
(1910] l K. B. 796.
162
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the leasehold agreement had been in issue in the first suit. The ascertainment of what was in issue in the first suit was had only by reference
to the finding of the deputy county court judge to the effect that the
defendant had accepted the tenancy. Again, in Cooke v. Rickman
166
( I 9 I I)
where the first suit, in which the plaintiff claimed rent under
a certain agreement, was in the King's Bench Division, and the secondsuit for further rent was in the county court, it appeared that in the first
suit the defendant, on the plaintiff's application for judgment under
Order XIV, had filed an affidavit admitting that certain moneys were
due for rent under the agreement in question and that the judgment
included the sums so admitted to be due. In the second suit she sought
to interpose the defense that the agreement was without consideration.
The Court of Appeal, by reference to Howlett v. Tarte and Humphries v. Humphries, held that she was estopped to do so, since the
admission of moneys due under the agreement was an admission that
the agreement was valid. The fact that the statement of claim in the
first case contained no averment of consideration was not permitted to
stand in the way, because it was nevertheless incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove a consideration. It must, however, be apparent that, failing
the technical factors of the common-law principle, these attempts to
apply it involve much straining. Indeed, the practical inappositeness of
the principle under the changed conditions of procedure is recognized
by Bankes, J., in the second of these cases when he says:
"The rule in Howlett v. Tarte was framed at a time when, owing
to the great preciseness in pleading, it could be easily ascertained
what was or was not a traversable allegation in the declaration, and
under the present system of pleading there may in some cases be
a difficulty in applying the rule." 167
It would, however, have been much more logical for the court in both
cases to have faced the reality induced by the change in procedure, and
in view of the absence of the technical environment of the commonlaw principle to have rested the same result on the principle of res
judicata in reliance upon those cases decided independently of the
common-law principle.
Turning now to the area historically beyond the reach of the common-law principle, we encounter an effort to restrict the effect of the
premises as res judicata by comparison of the objects of the first and
the second suits. Here should be mentioned Behrens v. Sieveking
166
167

[1911] 2 K. B. II25.
Cooke v. Rickman, [1911] 2 K. B. 1125 at 1130.
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(1837)168 in chancery, where Lord Chancellor Cottenham, in passing
upon a plea of proceedin~ in the Lord Mayor's Court, interposed to a
bill of interpleader, seems to have taken the view that some identity
of object was required for conclusiveness.
"It was necessary," he said, "to shew that the proceedings in which
the Plaintiffs were alleged to have failed were taken for the same
purpose as the present suit; for the issue might have been the same,
while the object was different; and the circumstance that the matter had been tried, as a matter of evidence, could not be conclusive."
And in Barrs v. Jackson (1842),169 another chancery case, it was again
the subject of debate whether a sentence of the ecclesiastical court granting letters of administration operated to foreclose litigation of the
question who was next of kin to the decedent. Vice-Chancellor Bruce,
with the citation of numerous passages from the Roman Digest, held
that the sentence did not prevent the court of chancery from investigating this question. In the course of his decision, he took occasion to say
that he thought it was
"to be collected that the rule against re-agitating matter adjudicated is subject generally to this restriction, that, however essential
the establishment of particular facts may be to the soundness of a
judicial decision, however it may proceed on them as established,
and however binding and conclusive the decision may as to
immediate and direct object be, those facts are not all necessarily
established conclusively between the parties, and that either may
again litigate them for any other purpose as to which they may
come in question, provided the immediate subject of decision be
not attempted to be withdrawn from its operation so as to defeat
its direct object." 110
But on appeal, Lord Chancellor Lyndhurst disagreed with the vicechancellor's conclusion. He held that the question was settled by the
decision of the House of Lords in Bouchier v. Taylor. He laid no
emphasis upon the wording of the ecclesiastical judgment, although this
-as appears from the report of the proceedings before the vice-chancellor-had expressly found that the unsuccessful competitor for administration had "failed in proof" that she was next of kin. B ouchier
168

'

2 Myl. & Cr. 602, 40 Eng. Rep. 769 (1837).
1 Y. & C. C. C. 585, 62 Eng. Rep. 1028 (1842).
170
Id., 1 Y. & C. C. C. at 597-598.
169
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v. Taylor, he thought, was nowise in conflict with Blackham's Case,
The decision in Blackham's Case, he said,
"amounts to nothing more than this-that if the question had been
put in issue and decided, the sentence would have been conclusive;
but that, not having been put in issue, you are not to infer that
fact from the sentence." 171
And in the present case he obviously considered that the point had
been put in issue and decided.112
One might have supposed that the effect would have been to set
at rest any suggestion that the conclusiveness of the first judgment for
the second suit depended upon any sameness of object or purpose in
the two litigations. But this apparently has not been the case. For we
find Lord Selborne, by way of dictum in The Queen v. Hutchings
( r 88 r) 178 in the Court of Appeal, quoting approvingly Vice-Chancellor
Bruce's observations above noted, with the remark that the reversal of
his decision was on "a ground not at all touching the statement of
principles contained in it." Similar expressions of approval have appeared in later cases.m But how it can be said that the ground of Lord
Lyndhurst's decision left Vice-Chancellor Bruce's statement of principles untouched is something very difficult to understand.115 As opposed, however, to the notion that two proceedings must involve the
same object may be cited Priestman v. Thomas (1884) 116 in the Court
of Appeal, a case arising in the Probate Division. Here a will, having
been propounded by Thomas and Gunnell in an action in the Probate
Division, was admitted to probate as the result of.a compromise of that
action. Subsequently Priestman, discovering that the will was forged,
brought an action in the Chancery Division against Thomas and Gunnell to revoke the compromise on this ground. In that action the forgery
111

Barrs v. Jackson, I Phill. 582 at 589, 41 Eng. Rep. 754 (1845).
lbid.
6 Q. B. D. 300 at 304 (1881).
1 H Stephenson v. Garnett, [1898] l Q. B. 644 at 682 (C. A.); The Queen v.
Ollis, [1900] 2 Q. B. 758 at 770; Re Allsop & Joy's Contract, 61 L. T. 213 at 215
(1889); Ord v. Ord, [1923] 2 K. B. 432 at 441.
175 This idea seems to have been started by the editor of SMITH'S LEADING CASES.
In almost the precise words later used by Lord Selbome, he says: "The principles laid
down in the judgment of the Vice Chancellor Knight Bruce are, however, wholly untouched by the reversal•••. " 2 SMITH, LEADING CAsEs, 7th Am. ed., 634 (*596)
(1873). Even Spencer BoWER, in his work on RES JuDICATA 222 (1924), deprecating
the frequent praise of the judgment in question, refers to it as involving "a rather
gross misapplication of correctly stated principles."
176
9 Prob. Div. 210 (1884).
112
178
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was found by a verdict of a jury, and judgment was rendered accordingly. Later Priestman brought an action in the Probate Division asking
for a declaration that Thomas and Gunnell were estopped from denying that the will was forged and fat a revocation of the probate. The
President of the Probate Division decided in favor of Priestman and
the present appeal was taken from his decision. It was held that the
decision was right, although the actions were brought for different
purposes, since the fact of forgery was one necessary to the decision of
the cha'ncery action. Said Cotton, L. J.:
"But it is contended that the action in the Chancery Division was
brought for a different object to that sought by the present action,
and that the purpose for which the present action is brought is not
within the jurisdiction of the Chancery Division. That is so, but
the action was between the same parties, and when the very point
has been decided in one action it would be wrong to allow the same
parties to litigate it over again in another court when all parties _
interested in contending that the will was a forgery were present
before the Court in the former action." 177
And both Cotton and Lindley, L. J J ., were express to the effect that
the matter had not been decided "incidentally" within the meaning of
the Duchess of Kingston's Case. 178
The rule which seems to have been the actuating one in the condemnation judgment cases before mentioned becomes decidedly articulate in The Queen v. Inhabitants of Hartington Middle Quarter
(r855),1 70 involving another manner of statutory proceeding. In this
case two justices of the peace of Lancashire had made an order adjudging the settlement of Esther Gould, a lunatic pauper, to be in Hartington Middle Quarter, Derbyshire. On appeal to the Sessions by the
overseers of Hartington Middle Quarter, the order was confirmed,
subject to the opinion of the Queen's Bench as to the effect of an order
made in I 849 by two justices of Lancaster. By this order it was adjudged that John and William Gould, unemancipated children of
William and Esther Gould, were settled in Hartington Middle Quarter in right of their father's settlement therein. It was accordingly
maintained before the Court of Queen's Bench that, as the last-mentioned justices were required to and did determine the settlement of
William and his marriage to Esther, as a precondition of adjudicating
177

Id., at 214.
Id., at 214, 215.
179 4 E. & B. 780, P9 Eng. Rep. 288 (1855).

178

1940]

REs

JuDICATA

2 49

the settlement of the children, their order became res judicata on the
question of Esther's settlement. The court held the point to be well
taken.
"The question then is," said Coleridge, J ., delivering the judgment of the court, "whether the judgment concludes, not merely as
to the point actually decided, but as to a matter which it was necessary to decide, and which was actually decided, as the groundwork
of the decision itself, though not then directly the point at issue.
And we think it does conclude to that extent.... In this case, the
marriage of Esther with William, and his settlement, were necessary steps to the decision in I 849: and therefore we think the appellants concluded by it now, when the same facts come again in
question as the basis of the present decision." 180
To be sure, the order in question contains the equivalent of a specific
finding as to the concluding facts; but as the court does not speak of
this feature, it is fair to assume that the same result would have followed in its absence, so long as it was clear that the point in reference
represented a necessary step in arriving at the conclusion.
Importance further attaches to In re Bank of Hindustan: Alison!s
Case (1873) 181 in the Court of Appeal, which involved the effect of a
common-law judgment in a chancery proceeding. An action at law for
unpaid calls on certain shares, brought against Alison by the Bank of
Hindustan, had resulted in a judgment for the defendant. Later in a
chancery proceeding to wind up the bank, Alison sought repayment of
certain moneys paid to the bank in respect of the shares, on the ground
that the consideration for the payment had failed. The common-law
judgment was held conclusive in his favor. It appeared that, while this
judgment in form merely determined that the bank was not entitled to
recover, it was reached on the statement of a special case which, in the
view of the present court, raised only the question whether Alison had
ever been a shareholder-a question which the judgment had by necessary implication answered in the negative. Said Mellish, L. J.:
"It is clear, I apprehend, that the judgment of the Courts of Common Law is not only conclusive with reference to the actual matter
decided, but that it is also conclusive with reference to the grounds
180 Id., 4 E. & B. at 794, 797. The court recognized that the order in question
was a judgment in rem but held that "it is unnecessary now to rely on the judgment
having been in rem; for it was a judgment between the same parties.•••" Id., 792, 794.
181
L. R. 9 Ch. App. 24 (1873).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol 39

of the decision, provided that from the judgment itself the actual
grounds of the decision can be clearly discovered." 182
A similar question arose in In re South American and Mexican Co.
(1894).183 The Bank of England, claiming by virtue of an agreement
on the part of the South American and Mexican Company to pay the
sum of £514,300, with interest in four installments, had brought suit
to recover the second installment ( the :first having been paid) and in
this action judgment had been entered by consent for the sum claimed,
£rno,ooo. Subsequently in a winding-up proceeding in the Chancery
Division, the bank, after the last installment had become due, presented
its claim for the unpaid balance. The official liquidator rejected proof
of the claim on certain grounds which had been alleged as a defense
in the previous action and expressly stated that the consent judgment
did not bind the company. On a summons to reverse this decision,
Vaughan Williams, J., held that the company was concluded by the
judgment, in respect not only of the installment in suit, but also of the
balance of the claim. The consent judgment, he considered, stood on
the same footing with respect to conclusiveness as a judgment rendered
on default or on controversy. Then, having reference to the statement
of claim and particulars on which the judgment proceeded,
"it seems to me," he said, "abundantly clear that the existence of
this particular agreement was of the essence of the Plaintiff's
claim in the action, and that it was impossible for the Plaintiffs
to recover the instalment of £rno,ooo in the action unless the
agreement alleged in the statement of claim existed. . . . I hold
that the judgment on the claim is a judgment for the £rno,ooo
under the agreement alleged in the pleadings, and that the judgment, therefore, affirms th~ existence of the agreement...." 184
With the observation on the part of Lord Chancellor Herschell that
he thought "it would be very mischievous if one . . . were to allow
questions that were really involved in the action to be fought over
again in a subsequent action," the decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeal.1811
In the same regard should be noted Woodland v. Woodland
86
( I 92 8)1 in the Probate Division. On a petition by a husband for
nullity of marriage on the ground that it was bigamous on the part
182

Id., at 25.
[1895] I Ch. 37.
184
Id., at 47, 48.
185
Id., at 50.
186 [1928] Prob. Div. 169.
188

1940}' '

RES

JUDICATA

of the wife, it appeared that the allegation of bigamy was grounded
upon the alleged inoperativeness of a French decree of divorce obtained
by the wife in 1914 against her former husband. But it also appeared
that in 1921 the wife had petitioned in the Probate Division for a
restitution of conjugal rights against the present petitioner. In this
proceeding the latter had entered an appearance but had put in no
answer, and a decree was rendered in favor of the wife containing, as it
is said, "in the usual form an express finding that the parties were
husband and wife." 187 It was held that this decree concluded the husband in the present case, since, as said by the court:
"The marriage was directly in issue in the proceedings for restitution. It was actually decided by the Court, and the Court could
not have made a decree without finding that it was a valid marriage. It appears from the judgment itself to be the ground upon
which it was based; there was a finding that they were lawful
husband and wife." 188
There can be no doubt, under these decisions, that, other things
being equal, a fact may become conclusively adjudicated for the purpose under examination as the result of admission, whether what is
sought to be applied is the common-law rule of the estoppel cases or
the general principle of res judicata. This is especially apparent from
In re South American and Mexican Co. and Woodland v. Woodland.
What, then, is to be concluded as to the present state of the English law on the general question, as compared with what it was at the
opening of the nineteenth century? It now seems clear that a matter
is not to be regarded as incidental or collateral within the ban of the
Duchess of Kingston's Case if it definitely constituted part of the
grounds of decision. Nor is it excluded because of being a matter of
inference from the judgment, within that ban, if, although not coming
to express decision, it was a logical and necessary step on the way to the
judgment-conclusion. The common-law principle of estoppel by record,
although paid formal homage in Humphries v. Humphries and Cooke
v. Rickman, has in reality, through supervening changes in procedure which have deprived it of its common-law mechanism, become
method of approach-and an extremely awkward one-to the appli~
cation of the. principle of res judicata, and may be regarded as substantially merged with that principle. The failure to discriminate in
terminology, especially evident since the Judicature Acts, which has led

a

187
188

Id., at 170.
Id., at 173.
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to the incorrect use of "estoppel" as a synonym for the preclusion worked
by the judgment-proceedings, whether resulting historically from the
principle of common-law estoppel or from that of res judicata,189
is but symptomatic of this substantial merger. If, therefore, anything
in the nature of uniform rule is to be deduced from the modern decisions, it would seem to be this, namely, that if the ground of decision
becomes apparent either from the terms of the judgment itself, or by
absolutely necessary illation from those terms, or becomes apparent
from the judgment itself, taken in connection with the pleadings and
other constituents of the record or, at least in cases where there are no
pleadings, in connection with evidence aliunde,190 it is to be considered
as having been conclusively adjudicated, so as to bind the parties in a
suit on a different cause of action. To such extent the property of res
judicata attaches to the premises of the judgment. This result, however, is ·clouded, on the one hand, by the expressions 191 which have
occurred from time to time in approval of Vice-Chancellor Bruce's
view in Barrs v. Jackson that diversity in purpose between the first
and second suits may operate against the res judicata of the premises
of the first judgment, a,nd, on the other, by Lord Selborne's doubt lD:i
of the correctness of the rule declared by Coleridge, J., in The Queen v.
Inhabitants of Hartington Middle Quarter, as well as by intimations
that that rule may not be applicable to other than exceptional cases.198
189

See Millar, "The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res Judicata,"

35 ILL. L. REv. 41 at 57 (1940).
190 The older law, with reference to common-law estoppel by record, did not
permit the use of evidence aliunde. Sintzenick v. Lucas, l Esp. 43, l 70 Eng. Rep.
274 (1793). In America such evidence has long been freely admitted to establish
identity of adjudicated facts in every sort of proceeding. Although in England the
practice has not gone to the same extent, there is no doubt that the principle is, at
least, well on its way to general acceptance. The rule of inquiry by means of extrinsic
evidence has been definitely settled in various cases where the judgment-proceeding
has not involved the use of pleadings, as in certain statutory matters. The King v.
Wheelock (Inhabitants), 5 B. & C. 5n, 108 Eng. Rep. 190 (1826); The Queen
v. St. Peters, Droitwich (Inhabitants), 9 Q. B. 886, II5 Eng. Rep. 1514 (1847);
The Queen v. Leeds (Inhabitants), 9 Q. B. 910, II5 Eng. Rep. 1524 (1847); Heath
v. Weaverham (Township) Overseers, [1894] 2 Q. B. 108. It is the necessary result
of certain cases in relation to county court judgments. Flitters v. Allfrey, L. R. IO
C. P. 29 (1874); Ord v. Ord, [1923] 2 K. B. 432. And expressions are to be found
indicating that, if occasion demanded, the rule would be given a wider application.
Heath v. Weaverham Overseers, supra; Ord v. Ord, supra. Whittaker Y. Jackson, 2
H. & C. 926, 159 Eng. Rep. 383 (1864), is explainable on the ground that the evidence in question would have contradicted the record.
1111 Supra, p. 247.
192
The Queen v. Hutchings, 6 Q. B. D. 300 at 303 (1881), supra, note 173.
193
De Mora v. Concha, 29 Ch. D. 268 at 301-303 (C. A. 1885); Wakefield Cor?oration v. Cooke, [1903] l K. B. 417 at 424.
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The American Law

In America the several streams of English doctrine disclosed at the
opening of the nineteenth century have variously mingled their waters,
giving rise at the same time to minor effluents whose channels have been
dug by the exigencies of the multiform situations, procedural and otherwise, in which the question of conclusiveness has arisen. The American
scene, however, has been substantially untroubled by any serious appearance of the idea that there should exist identity of purpose or object
between the first and second suits as a condition of conclusiveness in the
present regard. 194 To be noted also is the fact that failure to discriminate
between the common-law principle of estoppel by record and the principle of res judicata with the concomitant confusion in terminology, has
in later years been even more pronounced than in England. As a consequence, while the common-law principle has been much more influential upon the result than in the English cases, there has come about
more definitely than in England, although for the most part unconsciously, what in practical effect is a merger of the two principles under
the general rubric of res judicata;-so much so that there is no occasion
for any separate consideration of the two. The larger influence of the
common-law principle is perhaps apparent in the exclusion, above
noted, of the idea that there must be any identity of purpose between
the two proceedings, but it is very clearly apparent in the notion that
as a mode of approach to the solution of the question it is not so much
the grounds of decision, as such, upon which emphasis is to be placed,
as upon the inquiry whether the point in reference had been the subject of issue in the previous suit. It is this notion which characterizes the
dominant doctrine, whose establishment has had its most powerful
factor in the case of Cromwell v. County of Sac,1 95 decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1876. Here, after stating the unquestioned rule that, where the second suit is upon the same cause of
action as the first, the judgment is conclusive as to every ground of
claim or defense that was or might have been advanced, the court, per
Mr. Justice Field, goes on to say:
"But where the second action between the same parties is upon
a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action
194

"The only matter essential to making a former judgment on the merits conclusive between the same parties is, that the question to be determined in the second
action is the same question judicially settled in the first." 2 FREEMAN, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS, 5th ed., § 672, p. 1418 (1925). " ••• the principle
runs through nearly all the American cases, that a judgment is conclusive, if upon the
direct point, though the objects of the two suits are different." Ibid., § 673, p. 1420.
195
94 u. s. 351 (1876).
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operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points
controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or
verdict was rendered. In all cases, therefore, where it is sought
to apply the estoppel of a judgment rendered upon one cause of
action to matters arising in a suit upon a different cause of action,
the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually
litigated and determined in the original action, not what might
have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters
is the judgment conclusive in another action." 196
Although the Court may have thought otherwise, this is not the
common-law principle of estoppel, for-to say nothing of the verbal
imprecision in referring to the "estoppel of a judgment''-that principle recognized as conclusive not only the decided issues, but also,
except as against attack by way of confession and avoidance, material
admissions. And, notwithstanding the Court's citation of Howlett v.
Tarte, its intention not to allow the rule to embrace the conclusiveness
·of admissions 191 would seem to be evident from its statement later in
the opinion that "a judgment by default only admits for the purposes
of the action the legality of the demand or claim in suit: it does not
make the allegations of the declaration or complaint evidence in an
action upon a different claim." 198
But some eighteen years later in Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler
Mining Co. (1895)199 the Court changed its view as to the effect of a
judgment by default, saying that such a judgment:
"is just as conclusive an adjudication between the parties of whatever is essential to support the judgment as one rendered after
answer and contest. . .. A failure to answer is taken as an admission of the truth of the facts stated in the complaint, and the court
may properly base its determination on such admission." 200
This being so, the doctrine, as expressed in Cromwell v. County of Sac,
must be regarded as enlarged to let in the conclusive effect of an admisId., at 3 53.
It need hardly be said that any rule negativing the conclusive effect of admissions in the present connection refers to admissions effected in the course of the pleadings otherwise than by demurrer or its statutory equivalent. For when res judicata
attaches to a judgment rendered on demurrer, no one can doubt that it does so because
the facts on which the issue of law have arisen have stood admitted by the demurrer.
When, therefore, in the present discussion, we speak of the conclusiveness or nonconclusiveness of admissions, it will be understood that we are leaving out of view the
case of decision on demurrer.
198
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 at 356 (1876).
199
157 U.S. 683, 15 S. Ct. 733 (1895).
200 Id., 157 U.S. at 691.
196
197
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~ion, material to the adjudication, occurring in the course of the pleadings.
Difference of view, however, from that of this corrected doctrine
has found place among the American courts, and in particular the rule
articulated in The Queenv. Inhabitants of Hartington Middle Quarter
has come to expression in sundry jurisdictions. The bewildering mass
of decisions with which we are confronted puts any attempt to follow
the doctrinal development quite beyond the reach of the present paper.
We can only note with respect to the results reached the leading
divisions of the doctrinal field. Accordingly, by a rough classification,
there are discernible three main rules, which we may distinguish as
(1) the rule of relative conclusiveness of the premises; (2) the rule
of qualified conclusiveness of the premises; and (3) the rule of absolute conclusiveness of the premises.
(1) The Rule of Relative Conclusiveness of the Premises. This is
the rule of Cromwell v. County of Sac, as amended by Last Chance
Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co. It insists that before any part of the
premises shall be deemed conclusively adjudicated so as to bind in
respect of the point in reference, that point shall have been in issue
in the previous suit or, if of fact, shall have been the subject of admission, express or implied in the pleadings therein. It represents, beyond
question, the doctrine of a majority of the American jurisdictions.201
(a) On the question of admission, however, opinion is not unanimous. By the necessary effect of some decisions the admission is conclusive against any form of attack in the later suit. This usually results
from a misapplication of the rule everywhere appropriate to the case
of suit upon the same demand already adjudicated, to the effect that
what might have been advanced is now foreclosed. 202
( b) Other decisions, more faithful to the idea resident in the
common-law principle of estoppel by record, hold that the admission
is conclusive against a denial in the second suit but not against attack
by way of affirmative allegation.208
201

See 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, 5th ed., §§ 688, 660 (1925); 2 BLACK, A
LAW OF JUDGMENTS, 2d ed.,§§ 609, 622 (1902).
202
Newton v. Hook, 48 N. Y. 676 (1872); C. Graham & Sons Co. v. Van
Horn, 49 N. Y. S. 401 (S. Ct. 1898); Phipps v. Oprandy, 69 App. Div. 497, 74
N. Y. S. 985 (1902); Harper v. Harper, (C. C. A. 3d, 1892) 53 F. 35; Collister
v. Inter-State Fidelity Bldg. & Loan Assn., 44 Ariz. 427, 38 P. (2d) 626 (1934).
208
Hanham v. Sherman, II4 Mass. 19 (1873); Adams v. Adams, 25 Minn.
72 {1878); Oregon Ry. v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., (C. C. Ore. 1886) 28 F. 505;
Meyerhoffer v. Baker, 121 App. Div. 797, 106 N. Y. S. 718 (1907); Phillips v.
Phillips, II8 N. J. Eq. 189, 178 A. 265 (1935). Semble: Orr v. Mercer County Mut.
TREATISE ON THE
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(2) The Rule of Qualified Conclusiveness of the Premises. By this
rule conclusiveness in the present regard is confined to matters which
were in issue in the former suit. It represents what would be the rule
of Cromwell v. County of Sac, taken literally and unmodified by the
Supreme Court's later decision as to the effect of a judgment by default.
Accordingly, no conclusiveness attaches to an admission made in the
course of the pleadings. The rule finds its rationale solely in the fact
of a previous adjudication consequent upon a concrete contest, at least
in the pleadings, of the point in reference. 204
Each of the two main rules above mentioned is attended with the
necessity of determining whether the point was in issue within their
meaning. Here we may note the following:
(a) There has found place the conservative view that a matter
is in issue for this purpose only when it has been controverted in allegation. This does not mean necessarily that the matter should have been
specifically in issue, for general pleading must be here taken into consideration, but apparently requires that the point must be one of ultimate fact which if not raised specifically by the pleadings, is such as
would have been the subject of specific controversy in the pleadings had
these been special. 205
(b) The great majority of the cases, however, do not insist upon
so strict a definition of matters in issue, extending the conclusiveness
to matters in the nature of subordinate propositions or logical steps
Fire Ins. Co., II4 Pa. St. 387, 6 A. 696 (1886); Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Harding,
86 Iowa 153, 53 N. W. 99 (1892).
In BIGELow, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF EsTOPPEL, 6th ed., 206-207 (1913),
it is observed that "there is the best authority for saying that judgment by default
does not conclude defences in confession and avoidance in a different action."
204
Jacobson v. Miller, 41 Mich. 90, I N. W. 1013 (1879); Bond v. Markstrum, 102 Mich. II, 60 N. W. 282 (1894); State ex rel. v. Cooley, 58 Minn.
514, 60 N. W. 338 (1894); Lublin v. Stewart, Howe & May Co., (C. C. N. J. 1896)
75 F. 294; Hodge v. United States Steel Corp., 64 N. J. Eq. 90, 53 A. 601 (1902);
Tudor v. Kennett, 87 Vt. 99, 88 A. 520 (1913); Gibbs v. Security Trust & Savings
Bank, 65 Colo. 413, 176 P. 827 (1918); Mason's Exrs. v. Alston, 9 N. Y. 28 (1853);
Craft v. Perkins, 83 Ga. 760, IO S. E. 357 (1889).
This view is strongly supported by I VAN FLEET, RES JuoICATA, §§ 217-227
(1895). "It is my opinion," he says, "that if an issue is not contested it ought not to
be concluded."§ 217.
205 King v. Chase, 15 N. H. 9 (1844); Vaughan v. Morrison, 55 N. H. 580
(1875); Metcalf v. Gilmore, 63 N. H. 174 (1884); Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton &
Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Laconia, 74 N. H. 82, 65 A. 378 (1906); Chesley v. Dunklee,
77 N. H. 263, 90 A. 965 (1914); Caperton v. Schmidt, 26 Cal. 479 (1864); Garwood v. Garwood, 29 Cal. 514 (1866); Coville & Garber v. Gilman, 13 W. Va. 314
(1878); Smith v. Town of Ontario, (C. C. N. Y. 1880) 18 Blatch. 454, 4 F. 386;
Oglesby v. Attrill, (C. C. N. Y. 1884) 20 F. 570.
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whose decision is necessary to determine the ultimate fact in issue.206
More usually such matters are identified as "matters necessarily involved" in the issue as framed, or by the use of some kindred expression.207 Limit, however, is frequently set to the extension by withholding conclusiveness from controverted matters which are purely evidentiary. 208 Sometimes merging with the latter is the limit set by invoking the rule of the Duchess of Kingston's Case against the conclusiveness of incidental or collateral matter. 200 By the weight of
opinion, however, a matter is deemed incidental or collateral in this
sense only when its determination has not been necessary to the support
of the judgment rendered. 210
206 "... subordinate rights or questions which are branches of a larger right or
question put in issue ••• are determined by a judgment on the merits..••" Pray v.
Hegeman, 98 N. Y. 351 at 359-360 (1885). "This doctrine ••• is equally applicable
whether the point was, itself, the ultimate vital point, or only incidental, but still
necessary to the decision of that point." Attorney General v. Chicago & Evanston R. R.,
II2 Ill. 520 at 539 (1884), quoted in Wright v. Griffey, 147 Ill. 496 at 499, 35
N. E. 732 (1893). "A judgment concludes not only the technical fact in issue, but
also every component fact necessarily involved in its determination." Rauwolf v. Glass,
184 Pa. St. 237 at 240, 39 A. 79 (1898). BIGELOW, EsToPPEL, 6th ed., 170 (1913),
speaks of "necessary facts in a chain as well as the primary facts in issue."
201 Chamberlain v. Gaillard, 26 Ala. 504 (1855); Babcock & Co. v. Camp, IZ
Ohio St. II (1861); Casler v. Shipman, 35 N. Y. 533 (1866); Huntley v. Holt,
59 Conn. 102, 22 A. 34 (1890); Sargent & Co. v. New Haven Steamboat Co., 65
Conn. II6, 31 A. 543 (1894); Coltrane v. Laughlin, 157 N. C. 282, 72 S. E.
961 (191 l ).
208
"Facts offered in evidence to establish the issue .•• are not themselves in
issue, and the judgment is no evidence in regard to them." Belden v. State, 103 N. Y.
l at 8, 8 N. E. 363 (1886). To the same effect: Badger v. Titcomb, 15 Pick. (32
Mass.) 409 (1834); Haight v. City of Keokuk, 4 Iowa 199 (1856); Ford v. Ford's
Admr., 68 Ala. 141 (1880); Cavanaugh v. Buehler, 120 Pa. St. 441, 14 A. 391
(1888).
"It is sometimes difficult to determine when the particular issue settled in a
judicial proceeding is of sufficient dignity to be covered by the rule of estoppel.
Whenever the question of fact is of such a character that it requires evidence to sustain
it, and upon that evidence a determination has been reached and declared, the fact
adjudicated is one which the parties and their privies will not be permitted to reopen
in a second controversy among themselves." Tompkins v. Hooker, (Tex. Civ. App.
1917) 200 S. W. 193 at 195.
·209 Eastman v. Cooper, 15 Pick. (32 Mass.) 276 (1834); Lewis & Nelson's
Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 153 (1870); Marvin v. Dutcher, 26 Minn. 391 (1880); Williams
v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58, 23 N. W. II0 (1885); Mullaney v. Mullaney, 65 N. J. Eq.
384, 54 A. 1086 (1903); Wells v. Boston & Maine R. R., 82 Vt. 108, 71 A. 1103
(1909); In re Wagner's Estate, 178 Okla. 384, 62 P. (2d) 1186 (1936).
210 Singery v. Attorney-General, 2 Har. & J. (6 Md.) 487 (1809); Kennedy
v. Scovil, 14 Conn. 61 (1840); Watts v. Rice & Wilson, 75 Ala. 289 (1883); Stannard v. Hubbell, 123 N. Y. 520, 25 N. E. 1084 (1890); Smith v. Rountree, 185
Ill. 219, 56 N. E. 1130 (1900); Moser v. Philadelphia, H. & P.R. R., 233 Pa. St.
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( c) In any event where the point in reference does not appear on
the face of the pleadings the ascertainment of whether the point was
in issue may involve resort to evidence aliunde, the use of which is
much more common than in England. Such evidence may also be
required, however special the allegations, if the verdict or finding is a
general one. And, a fortiori, occasion for like resort may arise where
there have been no pleadings.211
(d) This recognized use of evidence aliunde has incident to it the
necessity of regulating the burden of proof in its adduction. An important question in this connection is presented when in the first suit there
is a plurality 6f issues and, as in the case of a general verdict or finding,
the record does not disclose upon which of the issues the judgment
was based. Manifestly, if for the plaintiff, the judgment is a conclusive
adjudication of every defense going simply in negation of the plaintiff's
cause of action, provided that but a single cause of action is alleged
and no affirmative defenses are present, and this however general the
verdict or finding may be. But outside of this situation uncertainty may
exist. Thus, where the complaint or declaration contains a plurality of
counts or where the defendant has pleaded a plurality of defenses,
one or more of them affirmative, a general verdict or finding, under
present-day practice, will often, in the one case, and always in the
other, leave unidentified the particular basis on which judgment was
rendered. Here it has been held, on the one hand, that there is a pre259, 82 A. 362 (1912); Kicinko v. Petruska, 259 Pa. St. 1, 102 A. 286 (1917);
Venetsanos v. Pappas, 20 Del. Ch. 453, 171 A. 925 (1936).
211 "The ancient system of pleading, which was conducive to the end of ascertaining the material issue between the parties, and the preservation in a permanent form of
the evidence of the adjudication, has been condemned as requiring unnecessary precision, and subjecting parties to over-technical rules, prolixity, and expense. A system of
general pleading has been extensively adopted in this country, which rendered the
application of the principle contended for by the plaintiffs [ that the estoppel must
appear on the face of the record] impracticable, unless we were prepared to restrict
within narrow bounds the authority of the res judicatf1. It was consequently decided
that it was not necessary as between parties and privies that the record should show that
the question upon which the right of the plaintiff to recover, or the validity of the
defence, depended for it to operate conclusively; but only that the same matter in
controversy might have been litigated, and that extrinsic evidence would be admitted
to prove that the particular question was material, and was in fact contested, and that
it was referred to the decision of the jury." Per Campbell, J., in Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown Steam-Packet Co. v. Sickles, 24 How. (65 U. S.) 333 at 343-344
(1860).
How large this matter of extrinsic evidence bulks in the American scheme may
be judged from the fact that in the work of Freeman no less than thirty-three pages are
devoted to its treatment. 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, 5th ed., §§ 764-773 (1925).
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sumption that the judgment was based on all the issues, which presumption can only be rebutted by a showing that the particular issue
was not the subject of adjudication.212 Sometimes, however, this presumption seems to be conditioned upon it being made to appear that
evidence was introduced on all the issues.218 On the other hand, a
large preponderance of opinion supports the view that no presumption
of the kind exists, that the whole question of conclusiveness is at large
and that the burden is upon the party asserting the res judicata to establish that the particular issue was actually adjudicated.m On the whole,
this may be the better rule, as frequently said; but one result of it is
this, namely, that if, for example, to a money demand, the defendant
puts forward the two defenses of payment and the statute of limitations
and a general verdict is returned in his favor, the ensuing judgment,
in the absence of identifying evidence, is not conclusive as to either
defense in a subsequent suit upon a di:fferent cause of action--a
result quite at variance with common-law principle, under which a
general verdict was committed to record in terms of the particular
pleading issues which it resolved,2111 and so was a conclusive finding on
each of these issues.
( e) Finally, it is to be noted that the term "issue" as used in the
statement of these two main rules is not necessarily confined to issues
of fact. 216 When occasion requires, the term covers, besides questions
of fact or of mixed law and fact, questions of law, not, of course, in
abstracto, but in their concrete application to facts proved or admitted. 21 '1'
The decision applying the law to the facts becomes conclusive "for the
212

Day v. Vallette, 25 Ind. 42 (1865); Hall v. Zeller, 17 Ore. 381, 21 P. 192

(1889).
218

White v. Simonds, Conant & Co., 33 Vt. 178 (1860); Rhoads v. City of
Metropolis, 144 Ill. 580, 33 N. E. 1092 (1889).
214 Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 606 (1876)_; Littlefield v. Huntress, 106 Mass.
121 (1870); Hoffman v. Silverthorne, 137 Mich. 60, 100 N. W. 183 (1904);
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 330 Ill. 413, 161 N. E. 723 (1928); True-Hixon Lumber Co.
v. Thome, 171 Miss. 783, 158 So. 909 (1934); Kelliher v. Stone & Webster,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1935) 75 F. (2d) 331.
215
See Millar, "The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure," 14 N. Y.
UNiv. L. Q. REV. 1, 19-7 at 213 (1937).
216
"Matters in issue or points controverted" is the expression used in Cromwell
v. County of Sac, supra at note 196. "A right, question or fact distinctly put in
issue" is the re-phrasing in Southern Pacific R. R. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1 at
48, 18 S. Ct. 18 (1897).
21
'1' Southern Minn. Ry. Extension Co. v. St. Paul & S. C. R. R., (C. C. A. 8th,
1893) 55 F. 690; State ex rel. Kennedy v. Broatch, 68 Neb. 687, 94 N. W. 1016
(1903); Bissell v. Spring Valley Township, 124 U. S. 225, 8 S. Ct. 495 (1887).
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purpose of the conclusiveness of those facts, but no further." 218 To this
extent, however, it is fully vested with the property of res judicata. 219
(3) The Rule of Absolute Conclusiveness of the Premises. The
third main rule reflects the English doctrine coming to definite expression in The Queen v. Inhabitants of Hartington Middle Quarter. This
rule goes on the ground that since the conclusion attained by the judgment is res judicata, every part of the premises essential to support this
conclusion is also res judicata. It is thus permitted to "reason back" from
the conclusion to the premises. 220 While, obviously, reference to the
pleadings cannot be dispensed with, in determining what the premises
were, the question of what was in issue is not here of major importance.
Indeed, there is distinct expression to the e:ffect that the rule applies
218

BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL, 6th ed., 112 (1913).
Under the two main rules of which we speak (the second as well as the first,
since they differ only in their attitude toward admissions of fact) specific contest of the
question of law in the first suit would logically be necessary to render it res judicata
in a second suit based upon a different claim. Recognition of this is by no means complete. See BIGELOW, EsTOPPEL, 6th ed., II2-II3 (1913); 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS,
5th ed., § 709 et seq. (1925). It does, however, afford the basis of decision in Stoll
v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 59 S. Ct. 134 (1938). Where the question is that of the
constitutionality of a statute there is especially strong reason for the requirement. Boyd
v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645 (1876), actuated thus by the disinclination of courts to
raise such a question of their own motion, would appear to accord with the conclusion
indicated. But the recent case of Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 60 S. Ct. 317 (1940), can be made to harmonize with that
conclusion only by taking a somewhat elastic view of what constitutes sameness of
causes of action.
220
"The estoppel is not confined to the judgment, but extends to all facts involved in it as necessary steps or the groundwork upon which it must have been founded.
It is allowable to reason back from a judgment to the basis on which it stands, 'upon
the obvious principle that, where a conclusion is indisputable and could have been
drawn only from certain premises, the premises are equally indisputable with the
conclusion.'" Buden v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200 at 203 (1868).
" ••• the judgment in favor of Mrs. Bleakley could not have been rested upon
any other ground than that her claim to be the child's mother was found by the court
to be true. Within the rule approved in Redden v. Metzger [46 Kan. 285, 26 P. 689
(1891)] it is apparent that by reasoning back from the judgment to the basis on which
it stands we find the judgment could only be based upon the premise of motherhood,
and this premise is as much a thing adjudicated as the conclusion itself." Bleakley v.
Barclay, 75 Kan. 462 at 473, 89 P. 906 (1907).
"The point falls squarely within the rule that every proposition assumed or
decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion and upon which such conclusion
is based, is as effectively passed upon as the ultimate question which is finally solved."
State ex rel. Atkinson v. McDonald, 108 Wis. 8 at 16, 84 N. W. 171 (1900).
" ••• the judgment is a conclusion, and, if necessarily drawn from certain
premises, such premises are conclusive as the judgment itself." Shelby v. Creighton, 65
Neb. 485 at 492, 91 N. W. 369 (1902).
219
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whether the premisory matter has been in issue or not. 221 And it goes
without saying that the premises may be either matter of fact or matter
of law in its application to the facts adjudicated.
These are but the more conspicuous indicia of the American law in
the present regard. 222 Their statement leaves unnoticed a myriad of
questions concerning collateral and subordinate phases of the situation
on which conflict of opinion has not failed to arise. At best, moreover,
difficulty is constantly encountered in the application even of the stated
principles. In particular, if the issue test is applied, "the difficulty is
to determine what points were in issue and determined by the judgment, or, rather what issues were necessarily involved in the judgment,
although not directly and expressly made and litigated." 223 The observation is an accurate one that "the line of demarcation between what
is res judicata and what is not does not always run true in case-made
law." m And especially is it accurate when said of the American picture.
The categorical variation of doctrine bequeathed to us by the early
Accord: Farmers' & Fruit-Growers' Bank v. Davis, 93 Ore. 655, 184 P. 275
(1919); Johnson v. Gillett, 66 Okla. 308, 168 P. 1031 (1917); Town of Pittsford
v. Town of Chittenden, 58 Vt. 49 (1886); Redden v. Metzger, 46 Kan. 285, 26 P.
689 (1891); Uncle Sam Oil Co. v. Richards, 73 Okla. 248, 175 P. 749 (1918);
Lee v. Kingsbury, 13 Tex. 68 (1855).
In a number of the foregoing cases, the judgment in question was one in rem,
but the rule is quite independent of the nature of the previous proceeding as in rem
or in personam. See the relevant observation of Coleridge, J., in The Queen v. Inhabitants of Hartington Middle Quarter, supra at note 180.
221
Bleakley v. Barclay, 75 Kan. 462 at 470-472, 89 P. 906 (1907); Johnson
v. Gillett, 66 Okla. 308 at 310, 168 P. 1031 ( 1917); Farmers' & Fruit-Growers'
Bank v. Davis, 93 Ore. 655 at 666, 184 P. 275 (1919); Lee v. Kingsbury, 13 Tex.
68 at 71 (1855).
222 It will be recalled that in the Continental law, the defense of compensation,
in relation to the present inquiry, is often the subject of distinct provision. Its corresponding institution in the Anglo-American law, that is to say, set-off, stricto sensu,
does not require the same special regulation, for the reason that our substantive law has
never recognized any species of set-off equivalent to compensation ipso jure. Accordingly, the claim of set-off is always regarded as in the nature of an affirmative counterdemand. Except, therefore, as the case may be affected by statutes or rules of court,
which exist to a limited extent, requiring the assertion of certain counter-demands in
a suit on the principal demand [see 2 FREEMAN, JunG~ENTS, 5th ed., § 788 (1925);
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, Rule 13(a)]
the defendant is free to assert or not the claim of set-off as he chooses. If, however,
there is a failure to assert the claim in the face of a provision of the kind, the claim is
lost. Whether in such case it can accurately be said that the preclusion from asserting
the claim in a later suit arises from the res judicata of the judgment on the principal
demand is perhaps an arguable question.
228
Mitchell, J., in Jordahl v. Berry, 72 Minn. 119 at 122, 75 N. W. 10 (1898).
:m Lamm, J., in Womach v. City of St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467 at 475, 100 S. W.
443 (1907).
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English' decisions, the inherited differences between the procedure of
the common law and that of equity, to say nothing of proceedings not
governed by the pleading rules of either, the necessity of adjustment
to the changes effected by latter-day pleading reform and the confusion
induced by an imperfect understanding of the historical separateness
of estoppel by record and res judicata, have all conspired, on a much
larger scale and in a deeper measure than in England, to thwart the
formation of a uniform and easily applied body of principle. Indeed,
we think it might be fairly said that there is no other field of American
judicature which redounds so little to the credit of its administrators
in point of the development of a clear-cut and serviceable system. And
the situation in England is better only in so far as it is that of a single
jurisdiction dealing with a comparatively small volume of cases.

E. Conclusion
What thus appears in the Anglo-American law is the case of a
basically simple matter wl).ich by an undiscriminating adherence to
traditional dogma, coupled with lack of attention to historical evolution, has become complicated in the extreme. There is no good reason
why a state of affairs so at varian~e with every consideration of directness and certainty should continue to be maintained. If we are willing
to take a lesson from the Continent, the remedy is plain and for the
most part easy of attainment.
First. Let us forget, save as a historical memory, the common-law
principle of estoppel by record. It has served faithfully in the past,
but has lost its vital means of subsistence with the disappearance of the
system of pleading on which it depended. Moreover, by a process of
assimilation, largely unconscious, to be sure, it has become substantially
merged into the Roman-derived principle of res judicata. Let the
latter, therefore, control throughout in name as well as in effect.
Second. In applying the principle 9f res judicata, let us, as is done
under the system originating in France and elaborated by the German
and other Continental codes, definitely restrict its operation to the
actual decision of the particular claim in suit, forbidding thus the relitigation of the same claim in any form, but, SUQject to what shall next
be said, not extending the res judicata to any part of the premises.
Third. Let either party, in the course of the cause, by means of an
appropriate pleading, b~ at liberty to present, in respect of any material
question whose decision is a precondition of .the adjudication, a prayer
that the determination of such question be made the subject of judicial
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declaration as part of the judgment to be rendered. As regards' a point
thus coming to be explicitly decided, as evidenced by the declaration, the
judgment would be res judicata, but otherwise, as before indicated,
would have no binding effect in a subsequent suit upon a different claim.
The particular mode and time of advancing the prayer would be
regulated by the circumstances and the will of the parties. To illustrate: A sues B upon a written lease of certain premises, running for
a term of years from May I, I937, at a rental of $2400 per annum,
payable quarterly, to recover $600 as rent for the first quarter. The
complaint alleges that the lease was executed on behalf of B by one C,
whom B had duly authorized so to act. B has never entered into possession, so that recovery must be had, if at all, upon the written lease. B
has two possible defenses: (I) that he never authorized C to execute
the lease on his behalf; ( 2) that, by an instrument under seal, A, after
the making of the lease, released B from any liability thereunder. With
a view to avoiding liability for future installments of rent, it would
be distinctly in the interest of B, if confident that these defenses were
well-founded, to ask that their determination be made the subject of
judicial declaration. Accordingly, if he so desired, he could add to his
answer a prayer for such a declaration,225 namely, one negativing the
authority of C and affirming the fact of release. But if, on· the other
hand, A were confident of his ability to defeat the defenses by proving
the authority of C and the inexistence of the release, it would be equally
in his interest to have a declaration to the opposite effect, namely, one
affirming the authority of C and negativing the release. And obviously,
as dictated by circumstances, the contemplated declaration, in either case,
might be confined to one of the defenses. In any event, if B's
answer had not sought the declaration, A, by supplementary 226 complaint could present the requisite prayer appropriate to his side of the
case. Indeed, there would be nothing to prevent A, if he knew or suspected that C's authority would be denied, from including in his original complaint a prayer for a declaration that C had been duly authorized by B to sign the lease. Nor, in those jurisdictions which see no
225 In strictness the defendant's prayer would constitute a counterclaim (see what
appears in the first part of this article with respect to the Austrian system, 39 M1cH.
L. REV. I at 22-24) and it might be well to call it so, but we are sufficiently familiar
with the idea of an answer asking for affirmative relief to dispense, if we choose, with
the specific label.
226 We employ the term "supplementary'' rather than "supplemental" with a
view to avoiding the connotation ordinarily attaching to the latter, as conveying the
idea that the pleading which it designates is one setting up a right accrued since the
commencement of suit.
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objection to anticipatory allegation in the complaint, would anything
stand in the way of the original complaint praying even for a declaration negativing the release. We need not carry the illustration further,
but it is apparent that cases may arise in which the declaration may be
sought at a later stage because of the contents of a reply, as when, in the
case instanced, the defense of release would be met by an allegation of
fraud in its procurement. So, also, we can suppose the prayer for the
declaration coming at a later stage because of being omitted at an
earlier time when it might have been advanced. In the latter case, the
matter of presentation of the prayer would be subject to control by the
judicial discretion in substantially the same manner as is now the matter
of ordinary amendment of the pleadings.
When the cause is one triable by jury and the declaration involves
a question of fact, that question would properly form the subject of a
special issue to be determined by the jury, although if this were the
only controversy of fact in the cause, a general verdict for one party
or the other would obviously afford a sufficient basis for the declaration.
Under such •a practice, the record would always show a distinct
prayer that the premisory question be expressly pronounced upon, followed by that express pronouncement in the judgment-order. Given a
proper prayer for the declaration, and, where required, its proper support by the verdict, then, apart from the case of ambiguity in the phrasing of the judgment-declaration, rto doubt could conceivably arise as to
the existence of res judicata with respect to the decision of the premisory
question. Gone would be the groping and uncertainty as to the range
pf the adjudication. Gone also would be the resort to evidence aliunde,
with the various doubts, and difficulties arising in that connection, for
now the record and the record alone would answer the question whether
the former judgment has foreclosed the relitigation of a particular
point in the later suit. Besides thus facilitating administration of the
principle of res judicata, the proposed practice would be in the direct
interest of substantial justice. Under the present system, it is exceptional
that a premisory question is controverted with a direct view to its effect
upon future litigation. Often, indeed, counsel may not acutely have in
mind the possibility of this future effect, and because of the minor
importance of the claim in suit or for other reason, fail to put forward
his utmost endeavor in contesting the point, only to find in a later suit,
when he is prepared to employ all the vigor and resources at his command in dealing with this same point, that by reason of the former
judgment it is now too late to do so. Under the proposed practice, on
the other hand, a prayer for declaration on the part of his adversary
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would definitely put him upon notice that the point is to be controverted
once and for all and warn him to train all his forces upon its litigation.
It is, of course, clear that the prayer in respect of the premisory
question involves an invocation of the declaratory power of the court.
And where, as in England and a large majority of the American states,
the principle of the declaratory judgment has been accepted, the courts
would have direct authority to entertain and act upon such a prayer.
But, even in those jurisdictions which have not yet given place to the
declaratory judgment, there should be no obstacle to the adoption of
the proposed practice. For whenever, under the present system, any
part of the premises acquires binding force for a future action upon a
different claim, it is in virtue of a judicial declaration, express or implied. If, for instance, in an equity decree foreclosing a mortgage, there
is an express finding that the defendant executed the mortgage, which
finding is deemed res judicata in a later suit, can there be any doubt
that the res judicata rests upon what is in reality an exercise of the
declaratory power of the court? The order of sale in the decree is an
exercise of its dispositive power, but the statement of the premises of
this order is in virtue of its declaratory power. If, again, in the absence
of an express finding on the point, the decree is treated as res judicata
in respect of the existence of the mortgage, is it not so because of the
implied judicial declaration of that existence? The declaratory fixation
of the premises is thus very plain in the case of the equity decree. In
the case of common-law judgments, had the principle of estoppel by
record been kept distinct from the principle of res judicata, it would
have been difficult, and perhaps impossible, to say the same thing. But
in view of the substantial absorption of the former principle by the latter, we are justified in concluding that in the law of today the commonlaw judgment in the present respect does not stand on any different
basis from the equity decree and that its premises, too, must be regarded
as established by judicial declaration, which may be express, as in the case
of findings where the trial is by the court, or implied, as is always true
where the trial is by jury. We do not call this fixation of the premises
by decree or judgment an exercise of the declaratory power, nor are
we accustomed to think of it as such, but that this is its juristic nature
cannot well be gainsaid. The dispositive power resides merely in the
award or withholding of what is demanded: what leads up to this
award or withholding, so far as it is bindingly adjudicated per se, is
adjudicated by virtue of declaration. Hence, when under the proposed
practice the court is asked to make a declaration in respect of a premisory
question, it is being asked to do no more than what under a different
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form and under a different terminology it is actually doing every day.
Thus the plan suggested implies no revolution. It represents but
a methodizing and reduction to scientific reality in a new application of
principles constantly recognized. And that, if adopted, it would go far
toward meeting the urgent need for simplification and clarification in
the present field, on both sides of the Atlantic, does not admit of serious
question.

